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ABSTRACT
We continue to develop our neural network (NN) based fore-
casting approach to anomaly detection (AD) using the Se-
cureWater Treatment (SWaT) industrial control system (ICS)
testbed dataset. We propose genetic algorithms (GA) to find
the best NN architecture for a given dataset, using the NAB
metric to assess the quality of different architectures. The
drawbacks of the F1-metric are analyzed. Several techniques
are proposed to improve the quality of AD: exponentially
weighted smoothing, mean p-powered error measure, in-
dividual error weight for each variable, disjoint prediction
windows. Based on the techniques used, an approach to
anomaly interpretation is introduced.
1 INTRODUCTION
An ICS generates a large amount of data. In this paper, we
refer to each data variable (i.e., sensor or actuator value,
setpoint, etc.) as a "tag". Taken together, the data can be
represented as a multivariate time series. Any anomalies
present in such data represent deviations in industrial pro-
cesses, which may have different causes, such as equipment
faults, the human factor, cyberattacks [9], [19], [31]. Early
anomaly detection and anomaly interpretation can help to
prevent serious consequences.
There are numerous methods of AD, such as LSTM-based
forecasting [11] and encoder-decoder [26], PCA, DPCA,
FDA, DFDA, CVA, PLS [6], clustering based [21], change
point detection [28], one-class SVM and segmentation [27],
process invariants [3].
Published results are invariably based on some dataset.
In the case of ICS, there are relatively few publicly avail-
able datasets. We have previously published papers on two
datasets, which we used to test our NN-based forecasting
approach to AD [11], [10]. In this work, we use the Secure
Water Treatment [33] dataset generated by a testbed ICS
with real-world equipment [34]. The dataset includes 51 tags
(25 sensors and 26 actuators) collected during two sessions:
7 days under normal operating conditions and 6 days during
which 34 attacks that had physical impacts were carried out.
Other researchers have proposed several approaches to
AD in the SWaT dataset: detecting anomalies in a single
phase of the industrial process [14], detecting single-stage
multipoint attacks [1], an invariant-based approach in [2]
and [5]. The first two methods perform well on the attacks
that have been studied, but they cannot detect multi-stage
attacks and don’t provide an anomaly diagnosis, i.e., they do
not provide the means of identifying the variable attacked.
The last method analyzes only a few tags and can conse-
quently only detect attacks that modify those tags.
In our previous work we manually selected NN architec-
ture based on LSTM or GRU RNN. In this paper, we introduce
an approach based on using GA to find the best NN archi-
tecture for a given dataset. The best NN architecture found
for the SWaT dataset includes encoder, analyzer and decoder
blocks, with their hyperparameters optimized for the dataset.
To further improve the quality of detection, we introduce
several useful techniques: exponentially weighted moving
average smoothing (used in our previous works), mean p-
powered error measure, individual error weight for each tag
values, disjoint prediction windows. These techniques allow
us to reduce the false-negative rate, balance false positives,
and tune the detector to dataset characteristics such as tag
value noise and predictability.
To achieve early detection, we use the NAB metric [22],
which is sensitive to detection delays and anomaly duration.
The proposed approach allows for anomaly interpretation:
we can automatically define a list of tags that were potentially
attacked for every anomaly detected. This is very helpful in
situations that involve multi-stage multipoint attacks.
2 ANOMALY DETECTION
As a train dataset we use the part of the SWaT dataset gen-
erated under normal operating conditions. The remaining
part of dataset, generated under 34 attack scenarios, is used
as a test dataset. Our approach involves re-interpolating tag
values to a uniform time grid. However, in the SWaT dataset,
values are already given on a uniform time grid with an
interval of one second. Before applying machine learning
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methods, we scaled the original data so that every tag value
had a mean value of 0 and a standard deviation of 1.
2.1 Detection Method
Denote the number of values (dimensions) for a single time
point asm. For the SWaT dataset, it is equal to the number
of sensors and actuators, i.e.,m = 51. For each time point
t ∈ N, let
xt = (xt1, ...,xt i , ...,xtm), i = 1,m,xt i ∈ R (1)
where xt i is the value of tag i at timepoint t . Denote the
length of the input window as L ∈ N and the length of
the forecast window as L˜ ∈ N. Then, given a total of S
timepoints in the dataset, we haveK =
⌊(S − L − h)/L˜⌋ input
and predicted time windows, where h ∈ N is the forecasting
horizon (see Figure 1). In this paper, we assume h ≥ 0.
Denote the input time window starting with timepoint t and
having the length of L points as
Wk = (xt, xt+1, ..., xt+L), t = kL˜,k = 0,K − 1 (2)
and the corresponding predicted window as
W˜k = (x˜t˜, x˜t˜+1, ..., x˜t˜+L˜), t˜ = L + h + kL˜ (3)
Figure 1: Disjoint prediction window for the AIT501
tag with input window L = 150, forecast horizon h =
150 and forecast length L˜ = 50.
Using a neural network, we approximate a forecasting
function f such that
W˜k = f (Wk ), f : RL×m → RL˜×m (4)
Given the system’s state for time windowWk , the model
forecasts every tag’s value for every second of time window
W˜k . This means that, according to (3), we have calculated
forecast values x˜t for each timepoint except the first L + h.
For consistency, assume
x˜t = xt, t = 0,L + h − 1 (5)
For each timepoint t , we calculate the mean error
M (0)t =
1
m
m∑
i=1
|x˜t i − xt i | (6)
Let the threshold valueT be the 99th percentile of mean error
M on a training set. Then, for each timepoint t , we report an
anomaly ifM (0)t ≥ T (Figure 2).
Figure 2: Attack detection on the SWaT dataset.
Wealso use some helpful techniques to improve the quality
of anomaly detection.
2.1.1 Exponentially Weighted Smoothing. The first tech-
nique is to use exponentiallyweightedmoving average smooth-
ing:
M (1)t = αM
(0)
t + (1 − α)M (1)t−1, (7)
M (1)0 = 0,α = 1 − exp
ln(0.5)
H
where H is the half-life period. This method allows us to
achieve a considerably lower false-positive rate (Figure 3)
at the cost of a slightly later anomaly detection. During our
experiments, we discovered that the half-life periodH should
be equal to the forecast length L˜.
2.1.2 Mean p-Powered Error. The second technique is to
use power for mean error calculation:
M (2)t =
1
m
m∑
i=1
|x˜t i − xt i |p (8)
2
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Figure 3: Before exponential smoothing, the system re-
port is false positive, and after smoothing with α =
0.067 that problem is gone
Here p is a parameter of the detection system. Note that
with p = 2, this will calculate the mean squared error. The
idea of raising the error value to a power greater than 2 is
to enable detection of short-term anomalies. If one of them
has an exceptional value, it might be lost after mean error
calculation and exponential smoothing, resulting in higher
false negative rate. At the same time, if p is too high, we will
only notice outliers, increasing the false positive rate. This
means that we need to choose such p that is not too small
(to reduce the false negative rate) but not too high (to avoid
increasing the false positive rate). Based on our experiments,
we found the best value to be p = 6.
2.1.3 Weighted p-Powered Error. There is noise in every
real-world system. And some tags are easier to forecast
(strongly periodic or even constant processes). If such a tag
has an unusual value, this can, with a higher degree of confi-
dence, be seen as a sign of an anomaly. On the other hand,
consider a tag that represents nearly random event, or has
values that are difficult to forecast (e.g., the atmospheric
pressure in the environment). If it reports an unusual value,
it might represent a normal state of the industrial process,
which corresponds to a simple fluctuation for the tag value.
This means that we should give more weight to tags that are
easier to forecast and less weight to tags that are difficult to
forecast.
The third technique is to use weights when calculating
Mt :
M (3)t =
1
m
m∑
i=1
wi |x˜t i − xt i |p (9)
It takes several steps to obtain the precise weight values
(Algorithm 1).
Note that εˆi ∈ (0; 1], hence wi > 0 and the equality∑m
i=1wi = 1 is always satisfied.
Algorithm 1:Weight calculcation
1 εi = 99th percentile of prediction error for tag i .
2 Eˆ = max
t,i
(|x˜t i − xt i |)
3 E = max(Eˆ, 10−8)
4 εˆi = max(εi/E, 10−8), i = 1,m
5 wˆi = − ln(εˆi ), i = 1,m
6 σw =
m∑
i=1
wˆi , i = 1,m
7 wi = wˆi/σw , i = 1,m
2.1.4 Disjoint Forecasting Window. The fourth technique
is to forecast for a time window that is at some distance
from the time window upon which the forecast is based,
i.e., forecasting horizon h > 0 (Figure 1). For example, a
forecasting model might get values from the time period
from 16:00 to 16:02 and, based on those values, forecast what
will happen from 16:05 to 16:06.
At first glance, this seems unnecessary, as we can try to
forecast from 16:02 to 16:06 and obtain even better results.
However, there are some reasons for predicting for a time
window W˜ that is disjoint from the input windowW . One
reason is that the greater the forecast length L, the lower
the prediction accuracy. Another reason is that a models
with a joint forecasting window (i.e. h = 0) is often prone to
just copying the last values of the base windowWk to W˜k ,
working as a simple linear predictor. And because most of
the tags represent continuous value (and it won’t change
fast), forecast errorMt won’t be very high in any moment
t . Hence, such a system might be a bad choice for anomaly
detection. The third reason is that some anomalies take a
long time and some time windows will even fully belong
to that anomaly. As a result, the forecast will be based on
anomalous data and hence will not be legitimate.
2.2 Diagnosing anomalies
In a real-world industrial control system it is always impor-
tant not only to detect an anomaly, but also identify the
specific part of the system that is misbehaving. Our detec-
tion method enables us to analyze Et i = |x˜t i − xt i | for each
timepoint t and tag i . Note that if there is an anomaly, its lo-
cation should match that of the greatest forecast error. Thus,
if Eta ≥ Et i then tag a is reported as an attack target for a
timepoint t (assumingM (3)t ≥ T ).
Let’s assume we have an ideal predictor. The greatest error
value in the prediction will point to the most erroneous (i.e.
anomalous) behavior. This method of diagnosing anomalies
works quite well and the results can be seen in Table 1. Note
that only two tags with the greatest prediction error are
listed as a detection.
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Note also that the first digit in a tag’s label represents one
of the six subprocesses of the testbed. For example, in attack
12, tag LIT301 was under attack and our system detected an
anomaly in tags MV303 and MV301, which are in the same
part of the physical system as the attack target.
Table 1: Example of anomaly diagnosis. A more de-
tailed description can be found in Appendix A.
Attack Target Detection
1 MV101 -
2 P102 MV301, P102
3 LIT101 -
4 MV504 -
5 AIT202 AIT202, P203
6 LIT301 LIT301, PIT502
7 DPIT301 DPIT301, MV302
8 FIT401 FIT401, PIT502
9 FIT401 MV304, MV302
10 MV304 -
11 MV303 -
12 LIT301 MV301, MV303
13 MV303 -
14 AIT504 AIT504, P501
15 AIT504 -
16 MV101, LIT101 UV401, P501
17 UV401, AIT502, P501 DPIT301, MV302
18 P602, DIT301, MV302 P302, P203
19 P203, P205 MV101, LIT401
20 LIT401, P401 P602, MV303
21 P101, LIT301 LIT401, AIT402
22 P302, LIT401 -
23 P302 MV201, LIT101
24 P201, P203, P205 LIT401, AIT503
25 LIT101, P101, MV201 LIT301, FIT301
26 LIT401 P602, MV303
27 P101 MV201, P203
28 P101, P102 MV201, MV303
29 LIT101 LIT101, AIT503
30 P501, FIT502 FIT504, FIT503
31 AIT402, AIT502 AIT502, AIT402
32 FIT401, AIT502 FIT401, P201
33 FIT401 UV401, FIT401
34 LIT301 -
Some models achieve better detection score, but lower
attack target accuracy. For the SWaT system with its 51 tags,
our model can detect an attack target with a 95% accuracy if
we look only at the top five highest error values (Eta ).
Note that common methods of anomaly detection like
Dimensionality Reduction [17], Isolation Forest [24], and
Oneclass SVM [15] don’t have an easy way of diagnosing
anomalies.
3 SEARCHING FOR THE OPTIMAL
ARCHITECTURE
In most cases, a neural network designed to solve a problem
is built in two stages. First, an expert analyzes well-known
architectures to decide which one of them is the most suit-
able for the task. Next, after building a basic variant of the
chosen architecture, the expert fine-tunes it "manually". The
second stage involves a huge amount of manual work, be-
cause it is often not obvious which configuration is the most
appropriate. As part of this study, we proposed an approach
to automatically searching for suitable network architec-
ture, which proved very helpful in the second stage of this
research.
Automatic neural network generation via evolutionary
computation [36] and genetic algorithms [4] has been re-
searched before. Most of the time neuroevolution is used
to optimize both network architecture and neuron weights
(e.g. [29]), but some researchers use it only for architecture
optimization ( [25]) and then train networks with supervised
learning methods. We use the second approach: generate
architecture via genetic algorithm and then train given net-
work via backpropagation [30]. It is still not used very often
because it has some drawbacks, such as high convergence
time and excessive computational power requirements.
3.1 Architecture Search Space
The main idea behind our approach is that the researcher
describes an architecture template (using a special descrip-
tion language), after which one or more neural networks are
generated. They will always satisfy the original architecture
template and the best of these NN between them is selected
as the solution. Each description consists of several parts:
• Optimizer (and its parameters)
• Weight and bias initializers
• Maximum number of layers
• For every layer we define:
– A list of possible layer types, which is a subset of:
Dense, Convolutional [23], GRU [7], LSTM [16],
Dropout [32]
– Activation function: Linear, ReLU [12], Tanh, Sig-
moid, Softmax.
– Possible layer size (as a range or a probability distri-
bution function)
For our SWaT dataset analysis, we used three architec-
ture templates, each representing one of the well-known
approaches for a time-series analysis: multilayer perceptron,
convolutional networks, recurrent neural network [10].
4
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3.2 Optimization with Genetic Algorithms
We used genetic algorithms [37] to find the best solution
that satisfied the given template. Mean squared error was
used as the loss function to train each NN.MSE on a training
dataset was used as an NN f itness measure.
There are a several hyperparameters when using genetic
algorithms. We set the initial population size N to 10, as en-
abled us to complete a enough evolution steps within a rea-
sonable timeframe. We found experimentally that deathaдe
should not be high (we used an age of 3) or the popula-
tion will stagnate, reaching the local maximum too quickly.
Using multi-parent crossover has been proved to be very
efficient [35]. We used pn = 3, as it proved to give enough
convergence speed. The reason for not using more parents
for crossover is that we need a greater population size for
multi-parent crossover (otherwise, the parent pool will lack
diversity). The population size should be proportional to the
square of the number of parents, which means that more
calculations are needed to complete the same number of
evolution steps.
3.3 Mutation and Crossover Operations
A mutation operation is performed in several steps (Algo-
rithm 2).
Algorithm 2:Mutation Process
1 def Mutate(NN , D):
Input: NN - original neural network,
D - architecture description
Output:MNN - mutated neural network
2 MNN ← copy(NN );
3 i ← RandomLayerIndex(MNN );
4 Using D, generate new layer i configuration;
5 returnM ;
A crossover operation is performed layer-by-layer. It is a
bit tricky as the architecture description has two types of
parameters: categorical (optimizer and layer types, activa-
tion functions, etc.) and numeric (learning rates, layer sizes,
etc.). For each of the categorical parameters we look at the
parent values and use the most frequently occurring. In the
event of a tie, we choose randomly. For example, if activation
functions for the second layer of parents are ’relu’, ’linear’,
’relu’, then the descendant will have ’relu’ as its activation
function for the second layer. If activation functions for the
third layer of parents are ’relu’, ’sigmoid’, ’linear’, then the
choice will be made randomly from the three values.
Crossover of numeric values is performed as binary occurrence-
based scanning [35] operation. Technically, the bitwise
vote function is used to calculate the resulting value. Let
Table 2: Architecture of the best performing model
found during the process of NN architecture optimiza-
tion.
Layer Type Role Output Shape
1 Dense Encoder (51, 43)
2 Dense Analyzer 96
3 Dense Analyzer 71
4 Dense Decoder (4, 51)
a, b, c be the parent values. Then the descendant value
d = (a ∧ b) ∨ (a ∧ c) ∨ (b ∧ c). All operations are bitwise.
For example, crossover between numbers 12 (binary 1100), 5
(binary 0101) and 15 (binary 1111) will be 13 (binary 1101).
3.4 Best Performing Model
The architecture of the best model found is described below.
It uses an input window of length L = 200, forecast horizon
h = 50 and forecast length L˜ = 4.
We used Keras [8] library to train our NN. The best-
scoring neural network architecture is shown on Table 2.
It was trained using the Adam [20] optimizer with de-
fault parameters and default initializers. The entire dataset
consisted of 105 527 samples.
4 DETECTION QUALITY METRICS
To tell which of the anomaly detection methods performs
better, one needs a metric. Some studies [18] used the F1
score as a metric. However, in this study, we encountered
a very unintuitive behavior of the F1 score and used NAB
score too [22]. An ideal detector will achieve a NAB score
of 100 and a detector with zero detections (n¨ull-detector)¨
will achieve 0 NAB-score. It is rare, but possible to achieve
negative NAB score in the case when sum of false positive
and false negative rates is greater then true-positive rate. Our
best model based on a multilayer perceptron (MLP) achieved
an F1 score of 0.812. It also produced a 69.612 NAB score.
We expected that ignoring all the periodic tags (31 out
of 51) would significantly harm the detection system. But
when we trained our best model on a "shrinked" dataset (i.e.
data without any nearly periodic series), it produced an F1
score of 0.767, which is only 6% worse than our best result.
There were 14 attacks (out of 34 with physical impact) in the
dataset that targeted periodic processes. Although ignoring
the 31 periodic tags significantly affected the detection qual-
ity (since the model nearly ignored 14 attacks), the F1 metric
failed to reflect it.
The reason for such strange behavior lies in the nature of
the F1 calculation. It focuses on the duration of all anomalies
detected. Thus, if we detect one anomaly that is one hour
long and skip 10 anomalies of one minute each, then we
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Table 3: Comparison with state-of-the-art models. Re-
sults for SVM and DNNmodels were taken from [13].
Model NAB score F1 Precision Recall
MLP 69.612 0.812 0.967 0.696
CNN 34.225 0.808 0.952 0.702
RNN 36.924 0.796 0.936 0.692
SVM* - 0.796 0.925 0.699
DNN* - 0.802 0.982 0.678
achieve a precision of 0.86, although we detected only one
anomaly out of eleven. And that’s the case of the SWaT
dataset: attack 28 is about 10 hours long, which is 65% of the
total time for all the anomalies in the SWaT dataset. Hence
for the F1 score about 65% of the model’s success will depend
on detecting a single (and easily perceptible) anomaly.
On the other hand, the NAB metric scores anomalies re-
gardless of their duration, it emphasizes the precise moment
of detection. Thus, a model that detects all of the anomalies
with a huge delay will score far fewer points than a model
that detects the same anomalies earlier. Notably, for a real-
world ICS early detection is crucial.
If the Table 3 we compare the results of our three best mod-
els with the state-of-the-art solutions for the SWaT dataset.
Our models are based on three well-known neural network
templates: multilayer perceptron (MLP), convolutional net-
work (CNN) and recurrent network (GRU-based). Notably,
network based on GRU units performed better then network,
based on LSTM units.
Another example is a model trained with a shifted fore-
cast window. We trained a model that made its forecast on
L = 200 data points (as mentioned above, each data point
represents one second) and predicted L˜ = 4 values with fore-
cast horizon h = 50. For example, based on tag values from
16:00:00 till 16:03:20, it predicted values for the time inter-
val from 16:04:10 to 16:04:13. The model had good detection
capabilities (18 true positives and a NAB score of 45.196),
but got an F1 score of 0.746. Note that the model based on a
"shrinked" dataset scored better in the F1 metric.
The proposed solution to such unwanted behavior is to
use the NAB score, since it rewards early detection and is
not affected by the anomaly duration.
5 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we further developed NN-based forecasting
approach to early anomaly detection.
A method for network architecture optimization with ge-
netic algorithm was presented.
We used the SWaT dataset, NAB-score and F1 score to
evaluate the quality of the developed detection model. The
best NN detects 25 anomalies out of 34 and shows 7 false
positives (see Appendix A). It got a NAB-score of 69.612 and
an F1 score of 0.812, with a precision of 0.976 and recall of
0.696. The average delay for anomaly detection is 11% of the
anomaly’s length.
Most calculations were done using the following hardware:
Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v3 @ 2.40GHz, 64 GB RAM,
nVidia Tesla P4. It took 33 hours of machine time to find the
best architecture and five minutes (with a batch size 2000)
to train corresponding NN.
It was also shown that anomaly detection researchers
should use the F1 score with care as it’s prone to overscore
detection of long anomalies and underscore detection of
short anomalies. In a real ICS even short-time anomaly (e.g.
nuclear reactor fault) might have devastating consequences.
We proposed several techniques to improve AD qual-
ity: exponentially weighted smoothing to decrease false-
positive rate, mean p-powered error measure to decrease
false-negative rate, individual error weight for each variable
to reduce sensitivity for noisy variables, disjoint prediction
windows to avoid using last values a prediction.
One of the main features of the approach presented is
its ability to interpret an anomaly, or, in terms of an ICS,
locate the sensor (or sensors) being attacked. For each attack
the detection system will report the most suspicious sensors
with an accuracy of 95%.
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A DETAILED MODEL COMPARISON
Table 4: Comparison of different detection models. Results for SVM and DNN models are taken from [13].
Attack Target Detection Detection Delay (s) Recall
MLP DNN* SVM*
1 MV101 - - 0 0 0
2 P102 MV301, P102 112 0.764 0 0
3 LIT101 - - 0 0 0
4 MV504 - - 0 0 0.035
5 AIT202 AIT202, P203, 11 0.952 0.717 0.720
6 LIT301 LIT301, PIT502, 42 0.909 0 0.888
7 DPIT301 DPIT301, MV302, 16 0.984 0.927 0.919
8 FIT401 FIT401, PIT502, 18 0.976 1 0.433
9 FIT401 MV304, MV302, 3 0.989 0.978 1
10 MV304 - - 0 0 0
11 MV303 - - 0 0 0
12 LIT301 MV301, MV303, 297 0.603 0 0
13 MV303 - - 0 0 0
14 AIT504 AIT504, P501, 13 0.97 0.123 0.130
15 AIT504 - - 0 0.845 0.848
16 MV101, LIT101 UV401, P501, 10 0.98 0 0.016
17 UV401, AIT502, P501 DPIT301, MV302, 16 0.978 0.998 1
18 P602, DIT301, MV302 P302, P203, 102 0.711 0.876 0.875
19 P203, P205 MV101, LIT401, 53 0.918 0 0
20 LIT401, P401 P602, MV303, 1043 0.294 0 0.009
21 P101, LIT301 LIT401, AIT402, 67 0.998 0 0
22 P302, LIT401 - - 0 0 0
23 P302 MV201, LIT101, 1164 0.0324 0.936 0.936
24 P201, P203, P205 LIT401, AIT503, 52 0.87 0 0
25 LIT101, P101, MV201 LIT301, FIT301, 105 0.834 0 0.003
26 LIT401 P602, MV303, 102 0.786 0 0
27 P101 MV201, P203, 89 0.331 0 0
28 P101, P102 MV201, MV303, 82 0.84 0 0
29 LIT101 LIT101, AIT503, 110 0.808 0 0.119
30 P501, FIT502 FIT504, FIT503, 79 0.842 1 1
31 AIT402, AIT502 AIT502, AIT402, 73 0.767 0.923 0.927
32 FIT401, AIT502 FIT401, P201, 71 0.836 0.940 0
33 FIT401 UV401, FIT401, 71 0.784 0.933 0.927
34 LIT301 - - 0 0 0.357
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